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Abstract 
 
Tebaldi & Mohan (2010, JDS) have established an empirical nexus between institutions and 
monetary poverty. We first, reflect their findings in light of recent development models, 
debates and currents in post-2010 literature.  We then re-examine their results with a non-
monetary and multidimensional poverty indicator first published in 2010. Our findings 
confirm the negative relationship and the nexus disappears with control for average income. 
Hence, confirming the conclusions of the underlying study that institutions could have an 
indirect effect on multidimensional poverty. In other words, the poverty eradication effect of 
institutions is through income-average as opposed to income-inequality. We discuss the 
confirmed findings in light of implications to: (1) debates over preferences in economic 
rights; (2) China’s development/outlook; (3) the Chinese model versus sustainable 
development; (4) the Fosu conjectures; (5) Piketty’s & Kuznets’ celebrated literatures and (6) 
future research to ascertain the inequality mechanism.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a substantial bulk of literature on the theoretical relationship between poverty and 
institutions (Rodrik, 2000; Chong & Calderon, 2000; Grindle, 2004; Sindzingre, 2005; 
Bastiaensen et al., 2005; Tebaldi & Mohan, 2008). Conversely, very few empirical studies 
have examined the link (Chong & Calderon, 2000; Hasan et al., 2007). An interesting study in 
the latter stream is Tebaldi & Mohan (2010). According to the authors, corruption, political 
instability and government ineffectiveness will not only hurt income levels through market 
inefficiencies, but would also escalate poverty incidences via increased income inequality. 
The results also imply that the quality of the regulatory system, rule of law, voice and 
accountability, and expropriation risk are inversely related to poverty but their effect on 
poverty is via average income rather than income distribution. 
 This note re-examines the findings on Tebaldi & Mohan (2010) with a battery of 
estimation techniques.  It complements the underlying study by using a different measurement 
of poverty: the new multidimensional poverty indicator provided by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). It is important to re-examine the findings of Tebaldi & 
Mohan (2010) because of two main developments in recent literature that have articulated the 
middle class and poverty-inequality relationship: the Washington Consensus (WC) versus the 
Beijing Model (BM) of development and the nexuses among, poverty, inequality and growth.  
 First, on the relevance of the middle class in development, China’s breathtaking 
economic development has led to a new stream of research on development models, inter alia: 
a reconciliation of the WC & the BM as a development path for other developing countries 
(Asongu, 2014a); strategies of development founded on a mixture of the WC with other 
successful development strategies (Fosu, 2013); self-reliance as a development path (Fofack, 
2014); false economics of pre-conditions (Monga, 2014); the New Structural Economics 
(Stiglitz & Lin, 2013; Stiglitz et al., 2013ab; Lin & Monga, 2011; Norman & Stiglitz, 2012) 
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which advocates for a synthesis of structuralism and liberalism; the Liberal Institutional 
Pluralism
2
 and the Moyo Conjecture (Moyo, 2013). According to Moyo, a middle class is 
needed to sustainably demand for political rights. Hence, economic rights should be 
prioritised at the early stages of industrialisation. According to the narrative, the BM (WC) 
should be a short-run (long-term) development models because while the BM is more 
effective at delivering a short-term middle-class, it is also a less inclusive growth model 
compared to the WC
3
. The Moyo conjecture has been partially confirmed in developing 
(Lalountas et al., 2011) and African (Asongu, 2014b) countries
4
.  
 Second, the recent literature on inclusive development has clearly articulated the 
critical feature of income-distribution in the effect of growth on poverty (Fosu, 2011; 
Thorbecke, 2013; Fosu, 2015). These narratives emphasise the imperative for policy makers 
to understand the following, among others: mastery of growth elasticity instruments; 
emphasise on how poverty is directly affected by income distribution and focus on the 
relevance of inequality in the growth-poverty relationship (Fosu, 2010a; Fosu, 2015; Asongu 
et al., 2014). More specifically:  “The study finds that the responsiveness of poverty to income 
is a decreasing function of inequality” (Fosu, 2010b, p. 818); “The responsiveness of poverty 
to income is a decreasing function of inequality, and the inequality elasticity of poverty is 
actually larger than the income elasticity of poverty” (Fosu, 2010c, p. 1432); and “In general, 
high initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty while 
growing inequality increases poverty directly for a given level of growth” (Fosu, 2011, p. 11). 
The conclusions of Fosu which converge with Piketty’s (2014)  celebrated ‘capital in the 21st 
                                                             
2
 This post WC school focuses on, among others: institutions in the delivery of good public commodities, 
institutional diversity and institutional conditions for successful economic prosperity. The interested reader can 
find more in this school in Fofack (2014, pp. 5-9; Rodrik, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2005 and Brett, 2009). 
3
 Moyo defines the WC as ‘liberal democracy, private capitalism and priority in political rights’, and the BM as 
‘de-emphasised democracy, state capitalism and priority in economic rights’. The interested reader can refer to 
Asongu (2014a) for insights into how a new development consensus could reconcile the BM with the WC.  
4
 There is an evolving literature sustaining that institutions are more endogenous to economic growth (Anyanwu 
& Erhijakpor, 2014; Asongu, 2014c). While the Moyo proposal/hypothesis is based on the Kuznet’s (1955) 
conjecture which has been recently debunked by Piketty’s (2014)  ‘Capital in the 21st century’, we resist the itch 
of engaging in the debate because it is out of scope.   
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century’, are valid for both African (Fosu, 2010a, 2010b) and a broad sample of developing 
nations (Fosu, 2010c; Asongu et al., 2014)
5
.  
 It is important to devote space to discussing how investigating the underlying study 
extends the above evolving currents and debates. To the best of our knowledge, the 
complementary/extensive motivation of this comment is at least threefold. First, Africa which 
is on time for certain Millennium Development poverty targets (Pinkivskiy  &  Sala-i-Martin, 
2014) due to its growth miracle (Young, 2012) has been experiencing substantial growth of its 
middle class (Kodila-Tedika et al., 2014; Ncube et al., 2011, 2014; Ncube & Shimeles, 2013). 
Accordingly, the continent’s decline in poverty relative to other regions of the world (Fosu, 
2015) maybe more traceable to the middle class than to recent narratives of growing 
inequality marring its growth (Blas, 2014).  
Second, poverty and inequality reduction challenges of the post-2015 development 
agenda are also incentives for this comment (United Nations, UN, 2013, p. 7-13). Hence, 
policy makers could be provided with new insights into poverty reduction, based on income-
distribution, the middle-class and quality of institutions. This helps in extending the evolving 
and interesting literature on inclusive and sustainable development (Bagnara, 2012; Monika & 
Bobbin, 2012; Ozgur et al., 2013; Singh, 2014; Miller, 2014; Mlachila et al., 2014).  
Third, this paper improves the evolving currents on the nexuses among, inequality, 
growth and poverty by assessing how an institutional dimension plays-out into the linkages. 
We have seen from the above that the growth effect of poverty depends on inequality because 
the inequality elasticity of poverty is higher than the growth elasticity of poverty.  Tebaldi & 
Mohan (2010) have concluded that institutions affect poverty reduction more through average 
income as opposed to inequality (or income-distribution). If average income from Tebaldi & 
Mohan (2010) is equated to growth in Fosu (2010abc, 2011, 2015), the resulting comparative 
                                                             
5
 More development literature on the nexuses among: inequality, growth and poverty can be found in Fosu 
(2008, 2009). 
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perspective is interesting. Accordingly, by comparing the Fosu narratives above with the 
Tebaldi & Mohan conclusion, we could logically infer that the conclusions of the latter that 
average income is more relevant than inequality in poverty reduction starkly contrast with 
those of the former: the response of poverty to growth is a decreasing function of inequality.  
This study also complements the underlying paper by employing an alternative 
measurement of poverty. In essence, the motivation for employing a multidimensional 
poverty index (MPI) is at least twofold: time and substance. First, on the time dimension, 
while the MPI was first published in 2010, the final version of the underlying paper was 
submitted in 2009, to be later published in 2010.  Second, on the substantive dimension, as 
opposed to the underlying paper which is based on a monetary measurement of poverty 
(people living on less than $2 a day), the MPI first published in 2010 considers poverty as a 
multidimensional concept. It complements the money measurement of poverty used by 
Tebaldi & Mohan (2010) by taking into account overlapping needs by a people within a given 
period.  Needs identified by the index are the same as in the three dimensions of the human 
development index (HDI). The MPI is a better tool in policy making because it helps in 
enhancing effective resource allocation by enabling policy makers to devote resources to 
those sectors with the highest poverty intensity. The index is of great importance in 
strategically addressing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as well as policy 
intervention monitoring. Moreover, the index can, inter alia be:  adapted at the domestic levels 
with weights and indicators that are consistent with the country and region; used to examine 
variations over time and; adopted for poverty eradication programs at national levels.  
 The rest of the comment is organised as follows. Section 2 further discusses the data. 
The methodology and empirical analysis are covered in Section 3. Section 4 provides 
concluding implications, caveats and future research directions.  
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2. Data 
The data and methodology are typically consistent with the underpinning study. It consists of 
a sample of 53 countries for the period 1996-2005.   Hence, we express gratitude to Tebaldi & 
Mohan (2010) for sharing their data compiled from the World Bank Development Indicators 
(WDI).  The main difference lies in the dependent variable. While they have used the poverty 
rate (at the PPP $2 threshold) for developing countries, we are using the MPI discussed in the 
motivation. It should be noted that these indicators are only limited to developing countries.  
In accordance with the underlying paper, the variables of institutions are obtained from 
Kauffman et al. (2007) and McArthur & Sachs (2001). Expropriation risk which is 
appreciated as the risk of forced nationalisation and risk of confiscation is used for conformity 
with other studies in the institutions and growth literature. It ranges from 0 to 10 and is 
measured as the mean value of each nation for the period 1985-1995. Therefore higher scores 
denote better institutions and therefore, lowered risk of forced nationalisation and risk of 
confiscation.  
The measurements of institutions obtained from Kauffman et al. (2007) include: 
political governance (voice & accountability and political stability/no violence), economic 
governance (government effectiveness and regulation quality) and institutional governance 
(corruption-control and rule of law). Consistent with Andrés & Asongu (2013): (1) political 
governance is the election and replacement of political leaders; (2) economic governance is 
the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities and (3) 
institutional governance is the respect of the State and citizens of institutions that govern 
interactions between them. The full definitions of specific governance variables are found in 
Footnote 9 of the underlying study. They can also be provided upon request. Higher values of 
the governance dynamics indicate better institutions. For further robustness purposes, 
principal component analysis (PCA) is used to obtain a general governance index.  
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The governance variables are in time periods of 2005, 2004, 2002, 2000, 1998 & 
1996. We shall use the terms governance and institutions interchangeably hence. Accordingly, 
while the underlying paper has used ‘institutions’ in the title, the variables used in the analysis 
are economic, political and institutional governance dynamics. Moreover the Kauffman et al. 
(2007) citation used to define the variables, conceives governance in political, economic and 
institutional terms. In this light, our motivation for using the terms of ‘governance’ and 
‘institutions’ interchangeably is to mitigate information asymmetry and enhance readability.   
 The geographic indicators that are sourced from La Porta et al. (1999) and McActhur 
& Sachs (2001) consists of coastal land that measures the proportion of land within a horizon 
of 100 km from the coast on the one hand and latitude which is scaled from 0 to 1, denoting 
the  value  of the latitude in absolute terms.   Colonial legacy indicators that source from La 
Porta et al. (1999) consists of a set of dummy variables,  which take the value of 1 if the 
country is a former French, Socialist, Scandinavian, German or English colony. The values of 
ethnolinguistic fragmentation are also from La Porta et al. (1999). 
 Under the hypothesis that institutions represent an evolutionary process which is 
contingent on previously gained knowledge, the specifications account for indicators of 
human capital accumulation in terms of primary and secondary school enrolments. The 
variable which is obtained from Mitchell (2003a, b, c) denotes the number of students per 
kilometre square in the 1920s.  
 The measurement of country area is based on the current geopolitical arrangement 
from the United Nations.  
                                                                                           
3. Methodology and empirical results  
Figure 2 shows that poverty rates are negatively correlated with institutions as countries with 
better institutions have lower poverty rates. However, the simple correlations shown in these 
figures do not allow one to infer whether better institutions actually reduce multidimensional 
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poverty. We address the eventual endogeneity issue by estimating a set of regressions that 
utilize the instrumental variable (IV) method with robust standard errors. Table 2 reports the 
first-stage regression based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) while Table 3 shows the 
second-stage estimates of Equation 3 of the underlying study.  
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The results reported in Table 2 indicate that historical levels of human capital, geography, and 
the origin of the legal system are important determinants of current institutions and explain 
approximately 30 per cent of the variation in the alternative measures of institutions. 
Specifically, in all regressions, controlling for geographically-related variables and legal 
origin, human capital density in the early twentieth century have a positive and statistically 
significant influence on all measures of institutions (except Political Stability). This indicates 
that countries that accumulated relatively more human capital in the early twentieth century 
turned out to have better current institutions. These results are consistent with those of Glaeser 
et al. (2004).  
We find that the coefficient of ethnolinguistic fragmentation is not significant, which suggests 
that this variable does not impact current institutions. These findings which are consistent 
with Tebaldi & Mohan (2010) run counter to those of La Porta et al. (1999). The legal origin 
variables are not statistically significant while geographic indicators are positively significant.  
 
Table 2. The determinants of current institutions 
 Dependant variable 
 Government 
effectiveness 
Political 
Stability 
Regulatory 
quality 
Voice and 
accountability 
Control of 
corruption 
Rule of 
law 
Expropriation 
risk 
Principal 
component-
weighted 
institutions 
Prop. land within100 km 
of the sea coast 
.086 
(0.094) 
-.126 
(0.090) 
.026 
(0.655) 
.057 
(0.382) 
.036 
(0.455) 
.009 
(0.855) 
.257 
(0.029) 
.059 
(0.604) 
Absolute latitude 1.978 
(0.003) 
3.390 
(0.001) 
1.515 
(0.041) 
1.048 
(0.203) 
1.625 
(0.009) 
2.384 
(0.000) 
2.445 
(0.113) 
5.391 
(0.000) 
Ethnolinguistic 
fragmentation 
.115 
(0.656) 
.659 
(0.083) 
.252 
(0.394) 
.623 
(0.064) 
.056 
(0.818) 
.251 
(0.337) 
.871 
(0.162) 
.251 
(0.664) 
Legal origin –British -.170 
(0.553) 
-.622 
(0.137) 
-.291 
(0.372) 
.463 
(0.210) 
.153 
(0.574) 
-.021 
(0.941) 
-1.257 
(0.103) 
.086 
(0.892) 
Legal origin –French -.218 
(0.380) 
-.505 
(0.162) 
-.160 
(0.571) 
.437 
(0.171) 
.159 
(0.495) 
-.093 
(0.708) 
-1.116 
(0.107) 
.201 
(0.717) 
Human capital density in 
the early 20th century 
.108 
(0.000) 
.015 
(0.712) 
.094 
(0.004) 
.133 
(0.000) 
.054 
(0.043) 
.078 
(0.008) 
.273 
(0.001) 
.149 
(0.020) 
Constant  -1.605 
(0.015) 
.599 
(0.522) 
-.774 
(0.294) 
-1.734 
(0.040) 
-1.387 
(0.026) 
-1.043 
(0.112) 
3.691 
(0.029) 
-2.894 
(0.049) 
Observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 55 63 
R-squared 0.4279 0.2740 0.2593 0.2911 0.2460 0.3630 0.3709 0.3576 
Note: lo_socialist, lo_german and lo_scandindropped because of collinearity. All regressions are estimated using 
White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. P-values are in parentheses. Prop: Proportion.  
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Table 3 presents the results of the effect of institutions and geography on the MPI. We notice 
that the geographical variables are not overwhelmingly significant. Hence, the conclusions of 
Sachs et al. (2001) are not verifiable here. As for the institutional indicators, but for political 
stability, all have a significantly negative relationship with the dependent variable. 
Accordingly, an improvement of governance/institutions reduces multidimensional poverty. 
Given that the instruments are invalid, we cannot project the results with confidence.  
Table 3. IV regressions of multidimensional poverty on institutions and geography 
 
All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. P-values are in parentheses. The  
dependent variable is the average poverty rates between 1999–2004; all regressions were run with standard 
errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. All first-stage regressions are estimated including the following set 
of variables: ln human capital density in the early twentieth century, dummies for the origin of the legal system, 
absolute latitude, proportion of land within 100 km of the seacoast, and ethnolinguistic fragmentation. IV: 
Instrumental Variable.   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Government effectiveness -.337 
(0.000) 
       
Political stability  .210     
(0.169) 
      
Regulatory quality   -.381 
(0.003) 
     
Voice and accountability    -.131    
(0.029) 
    
Control of corruption     -.568 
(0.019) 
   
Rule of law      -.354 
(0.008) 
  
Expropriation risk       -.143 
(0.000) 
 
Principal component-
weighted institutions 
       -.232    
(0.007) 
Prop. land within100 km of 
the seacoast 
.004 
(0.805) 
.022    
(0.377) 
-.009 
(0.647) 
.001    
(0.940) 
.000    
(0.998) 
-.011 
(0.563) 
.027    
(0.122) 
-.008    
(0.736) 
Absolute latitude .206 
(0.478) 
-1.315 
(0.014) 
.090 
(0.797) 
-.568 
(0.004) 
.346    
(0.507) 
.230    
(0.572) 
-.096 
(0.698) 
.713    
Constant  -.055 
(0.803) 
.305    
(0.252) 
.136     
(0.593) 
.242    
(0.234) 
-.188 
(0.612) 
.091    
(0.715) 
.762 
(0.003) 
-.112 
(0.723) 
Observations  63 63 63 63 63 63 55 63 
Uncentered R-squared 0.6314 0.3555 0.4372 0.6298 0.1488 0.4889 0.6441 0.3012 
Anderson 
Underidentification test (p-
value) 
0.0042 0.3182 0.0710 0.0015 0.2201 0.0552 0.0103 0.1668 
Sargan statistic 
(overidentificationtest (p-
value) 
0.0609 0.0095 0.0838 0.0004 0.2009 0.0196 0.0010 0.1621 
Hausmann test 
overidentification test (p-
value) 
0.0596 0.0060 0.0853 0.0000 
 
0.2174 0.0154 0.0002 0.1740 
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 
(p-value) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 4 below differs from the preceding table in the fact that, it controls for the impact of 
initial income, instead of geographical effects. However, it follows the same econometric 
logic. Hence, the specifications are comparable. We notice that the significance of all 
institutional variables disappear in the interest of average income. The signs of these 
institutional/governance indicators also become very unstable.  
Table 4. IV regressions of multidimensional poverty on institutions and initial GDP per 
capita 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Government effectiveness -.138 
(0.169) 
       
Political stability  -.0514 
(0.455) 
      
Regulatory quality   -.080 
(0.490) 
     
Voice and accountability    .040 
(0.364) 
    
Control of corruption     -.111 
(0.778) 
   
Rule of law      -.187 
(0.152) 
  
Expropriation risk       .015 
(0.658) 
 
Principal component-
weighted institutions 
       -.023 
(0.837) 
Log of average income -.102 
(0.048) 
-.156 
(0.000) 
-.136 
(0.007) 
-.184 
(0.000) 
-.137 
(0.247) 
-.106 
(0.029) 
-.186 
(0.000) 
-.147 
(0.191) 
Constant  .932 
(0.040) 
1.389 
(0.000) 
1.23 
(0.006) 
1.656 
(0.000) 
1.207 
(0.294) 
.917 
(0.043) 
1.572 
(0.000) 
1.3226 
(0.191) 
Observations  63 63 63 63 63 63 55  
Uncentered R-squared 0.8223 0.8361 0.8376 0.8654 0.8260 0.7635 0.8461 0.8484 
Anderson 
Underidentification test 
(p-value) 
0.0920 0.2753 0.3708 0.0056 0.9718 0.3243 0.0170 0.8832 
Sargan statistic 
(overidentification test (p-
value) 
0.1285 0.0538 0.0502 0.0272 0.0537 0.3034 0.0286 0.0316 
All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. P-values are in parentheses. 
Log : Logarithm. IV: Instrumental Variable.   
 
The weakness of Table 3 is based on the fact that the instruments are not efficient and may be 
of questionable validity. On this account, we follow the same econometric logic as in Table 5 
while using only human capital as an instrument. The table in the Appendix represents the 
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first-stage of Table 5. Based on the results, we ascertain that the instruments are valid this 
time. Accordingly, but for political stability, all the governance variables are significant.  
It should be noted that Table 5 is a reproduction of Table 4. While in Table 4 we have 
instrumented our indicators of interest with many variables, we have retained only human 
capital accumulation as instrument in Table 5. Hence, since we do not have at least two 
instruments for the over-identification test, we present the regression in two stages. The first-
stage in which we have investigated if cumulative human capital is a good instrument is 
provided in the appendix. In this light, Table 5 is the second-stage of the estimation.  
 
 
Table 5. IV regressions of multidimensional poverty on institutions and geography 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Government effectiveness -.3418 
(0.000) 
       
Political stability  48.174 
(0.983) 
      
Regulatory quality   -.436 
(0.003) 
     
Voice and accountability    -.291 
(0.002) 
    
Control of corruption     -.6523 
(0.016) 
   
Rule of law      -.475 
(0.005) 
  
Expropriation risk       -.1787 
(0.001) 
 
Principal component-
weighted institutions 
       -.238 
(0.008) 
Prop. land within100 km 
of thesea coast 
-.0019 
(0.906) 
4.883 
(0.983) 
-.0177 
(0.429) 
-.0089 
(0.674) 
-.0048 
(0.859) 
-.0193 
(0.423) 
.023 
(0.313) 
-.0115 
(0.643) 
Absolute latitude .275 
(0.342) 
-138.742 
(0.983) 
.283 
(0.465) 
-.2997 
(0.234) 
.460 
(0.398) 
.486 
(0.305) 
.053 
(0.866) 
.630 
(0.252) 
Constant  .0027 
(0.990) 
-4.482 
(0.985) 
.185 
(0.508) 
.252 
(0.350) 
-.2039 
(0.615) 
.0633 
(0.837) 
.991 
(0.007) 
-.0677 
(0.844) 
Observations  66 66 66 66 66 66 57 66 
Uncentered R-squared 0.5750 -1.6e+04 0.2490 0.2880 0.1702 0.1458 0.2942 0.0362 
All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. P-values are in parentheses. 
Prop : Proportion. IV : Instrumental Variable.   
When the instruments of the Appendix are employed in the specifications of Table 4, the 
same results are obtained
6
. In other words, the institutional variables are not significant. This 
implies that the effect of institutions disappears when we control for the revenue effect. 
                                                             
6
 Results can be provided upon request.  
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Hence, consistent with the underlying paper, the effects of institution on multidimensional 
poverty are indirect.   
4. Concluding implications, caveats and future research directions 
 
After employing the same economic techniques and data (but for the dependent variable) as in 
Tebaldi and Mohan (2010), we have established the same conclusion: institutions mitigate 
poverty through the average income channel, as opposed to the inequality mechanisms. In 
other words, we have used a non monetary & multidimensional poverty measurement to 
confirm the findings of the underlying study that have been based on a monetary 
measurement of poverty. Hence, we have used a more holistic poverty measurement, 
published in 2010 after Tebaldi & Mohan (2010), to confirm the findings of the underlying 
study.  In light of growing currents and debates, this finding has implications for: (1) the 
debate over preferences in economic rights; (2) China’s development/outlook; (3) the Chinese 
model versus sustainable development; (4) Fosu’s conjectures; (5) Piketty’s celebrated 
literature contrasting with Kuznets’ and (6) future research to ascertain the inequality 
mechanism.  
First, the results have critical implications over preferences in economic rights. In 
simple terms, the conclusions sound like: the economic rights to ‘equitable income 
distribution’ are less important than economic rights ‘to economic growth or average income’, 
as a mechanism from institutions to poverty mitigation. The logical inference is that, 
institutions should be at the service of economic growth instead of inequality in order to fight 
poverty. This implies income-average is a more instrumental poverty eradication channel than 
income-inequality. But this implication reminds us of Lewis (1955):  ‘Output may be 
growing, and yet the mass of the people may be becoming poorer’. Accordingly, ‘Lewis led 
all developing countries to water, proverbially speaking, some African countries have so far 
chosen not to drink’ (Amavilah, 2014). This may paint a picture showing why Africa is the 
15 
 
continent with the highest poverty rate. But we resist the itch of engaging further in this 
direction, as we are more concerned with the underlying paper.  
Second, the findings may also reflect the Chinese current development outlook and the 
Beijing Model. While poverty has decreased substantially over the past decades owing to the 
country’s breathtaking economic growth, inequality has also risen sharply (Asongu, 2014a). 
This implies, institutional development or governance in China has enabled the mitigation of 
poverty through average income (which has risen) as opposed to income-inequality (which 
has also risen). A natural criticism that may counter this line of inference in relation to the 
findings should be that China has questionable institutional quality. Accordingly, while China 
may have questionable political governance standards (i.e, the election and replacement of 
political leaders), the other two governance dynamics of economic governance (regulation 
quality and government effectiveness) and institutional governance (corruption-control and 
rule of law) escape this criticism. Moreover, a dimension of political governance (political 
stability/no violence) is consistently insignificant in our findings, which gives more weight to 
the other two governance dynamics that are relevant to the Chinese model. 
Third, the Chinese model as conceived by the Moyo conjecture discussed in the 
introduction is not a sustainable development model because it mitigates inequality at a lower 
rate than the Washington Consensus (WC). Hence in light of the post-2015 development 
agenda, putting economic growth before income-inequality may not be the right way forward 
towards inclusive and sustainable development.  
Fourth, the findings run counter to the Fosu conjectures discussed in the introduction 
that are valid for both African and a broad sample of developing countries. As a reminder, we 
have seen that the response of poverty to growth is a decreasing function of inequality 
because the growth elasticity of poverty is lower than the inequality elasticity of poverty.  
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Fifth, Piketty’s celebrated ‘capital in the 21st century’ which has debunked the 
Kuznets (1995) conjectures is indirectly called to question. In other words, the findings have 
the following policy implication: institutions should be developed at the service of economic 
growth if poverty is to be eradicated. This substantially contradicts a growing strand of 
literature calling for less developed countries to be oriented towards industrialisation in the 
perspective of Piketty, as opposed to Kuznets (Asongu, 2014d). Overall, the findings 
seriously challenge the substantially documented concern of inequality as a critical set back to 
21
st
 century capitalism (Brada & Bah, 2014).  
Sixth, the above criticisms would have some substance as long as the dimension of 
inequality in the conclusions of Tebaldi and Mohan (2010) is not backed by some empirical 
validity. Accordingly, the channel of inequality is used as a logical alternative to the average 
income mechanism without empirical justification. While the intuition for this inference by 
the authors is logical and sound, it nonetheless has to be backed by sound empirical validity. 
The evolving currents and debates after the published paper cannot be overlooked. In this 
light, introducing inequality indicators into the analysis is an interesting future research 
direction that would improve the extant of literature on the issues.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1. The determinants of current institutions 
 Government 
effectiveness 
Political 
Stability 
Regulatory 
quality 
Voice and 
accountability 
Control of 
corruption 
Rule of 
law 
Expropriation 
risk 
Principal 
component-
weighted 
institutions 
Human capital density in 
the early 20th century 
.11077 
(0.000) 
-.0007 
(0.984) 
.0868 
(0.003) 
.1300 
(0.000) 
.0580 
(0.017) 
.07966 
(0.003) 
.2848 
(0.001) 
.1588 
(0.011) 
Prop. land within100 km of 
the sea coast 
.0832 
(0.091) 
-.1019 
(0.175) 
.0288 
(0.597) 
.0736 
(0.257) 
.0391 
(0.390) 
.0232 
(0.644) 
.2894 
(0.034) 
.0791 
(0.498) 
Absolute latitude 1.9828 
(0.000) 
2.8716 
(0.000) 
1.5729 
(0.006) 
.3529 
(0.592) 
1.3227 
(0.006) 
1.869 
(0.001) 
1.859 
(0.193) 
4.3328 
(0.001) 
Constant  -1.7027 
(0.005) 
.1051 
(0.907) 
-.9169 
(0.170) 
-1.1425 
(0.148) 
-1.209 
(0.031) 
-1.097 
(0.075) 
2.655 
(0.111) 
-2.7378 
(0.056) 
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 57 66 
R-squared 0.4617 0.2280 0.3032 0.2352 0.2579 0.3619 0.2892 0.3304 
All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. P-values are in parentheses. 
Prop: proportion.  
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